无法兑现的承诺：2014年以来俄乌战争期间的调解努力（二）
Unfulfillable Promise: Mediation Efforts in the Russian-Ukrainian War since 2014
Part 2. Wartime Mediation
本文是对俄乌战争灰色地带（2014-2022年）和常规阶段（2022年至今）调解有效性的两部分评估中的第二部分。
This memo is the second in a two-part assessment of the effectiveness of mediation in the Russian-Ukrainian war during its gray-zone (2014-2022) and conventional (2022-present) stages.
越来越多的人支持这样一种观点，即俄乌战争已经到了一个关键时刻，乌克兰及其西方伙伴可能都需要改变他们的做法。在一年多的时间里，双方都没有取得任何改变游戏规则的领土或其他成果，有人可能会说，提出和平倡议的时机已经成熟。
然而，谈判的前景黯淡，更不用说可持续解决了。双方都没有可靠的胜利之路，但双方都有可能继续调集必要的资源，拒绝对手获胜。在这种情况下，基辅及其西方伙伴更有意义地进行长期挖掘：阻止俄罗斯进一步获得领土；维持西方的政治、财政和军事支持；为乌克兰制定可靠的安全保障；以及在加入欧盟方面取得进展。这将需要仔细评估实现全面和立即恢复乌克兰主权和领土完整的战略和时间表，并将其与西方现有的支持水平相匹配。
There is growing support for the argument that the war in Ukraine has reached a critical juncture at which both Ukraine and its Western partners may need to change their approach. With neither side having made any game-changing territorial or other gains in more than a year, one could argue that the time is ripe for a peace initiative.
However, prospects for negotiations, let alone a sustainable settlement, are bleak. Neither side has a credible path to victory, but each can likely continue to muster the resources necessary to deny victory to its opponent. In this situation, it makes more sense for Kyiv and its Western partners to dig in for the long haul: preventing further Russian territorial gains; sustaining Western political, financial, and military support; developing credible security guarantees for Ukraine; and making progress toward EU accession. This will require assessing carefully the strategy and timeline for achieving the full and immediate restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and matching these to the level of Western support available.
Peace Initiatives in the Russian-Ukrainian Conventional War: Mission Impossible?
俄乌常规战争中的和平倡议：不可能的任务？
目前关于战场内外可以实现什么以及多久实现的辩论涉及乌克兰军事和政治领导人之间在战略上的公开分歧。《经济学人》发表了乌克兰武装部队总司令扎卢日内将军的一篇文章和对他的采访，他在文章中认为，俄乌战争已经演变成一种阵地战争，在这种战争中，胜利取决于交战各方的军事力量和（未来）潜力。在与欧盟委员会主席乌尔苏拉·冯德莱恩举行的联合新闻发布会上，总统泽连斯基否认存在这种僵局，而他的副幕僚长伊霍尔·兹霍夫克瓦则斥责扎卢日尼的言论。《时代》杂志的一篇文章暗示情况更加复杂，描绘了泽连斯基核心圈子审议的惨淡画面，而美国全国广播公司则报道了西方对乌克兰施加越来越大的压力，要求其考虑与俄罗斯达成一项至少涉及一些领土让步的和平协议。
正如I.William Zartman所说，在这样一种情况下，谈判和让步是有意义的：交战各方发现自己陷入了一个相互伤害的僵局——也就是说，他们“陷入了一场无法升级到胜利的冲突中，这种僵局对他们双方都是痛苦的（尽管不一定程度相同或原因相同）。”虽然新出现的文献在内部冲突的背景下讨论成熟度理论，但人们对其适用于乌克兰等混合冲突的情况知之甚少，蒂莫西·D·西斯克认为，乌克兰的解决前景“可能更多地取决于国际联盟的复杂性，而不是[与]国内对主角的看法，他们之间的权力动态，威胁，以及旷日持久的内战后的彻底疲惫。”
The current debate over what is attainable on and off the battlefield—and how soon—involves a very public disagreement over strategy between the military and political leaderships of Ukraine. The Economist published an article by, and an interview with, commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian armed forces General Valery Zaluzhny in which he argued that the Russian-Ukrainian war had turned into a positional form of war in which a victory is a function of the military power and (future) potentials of the belligerent parties. Responding during a joint press conference with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, President Volodymyr Zelensky denied the existence of such a stalemate, while his deputy chief of staff, Ihor Zhovkva, reprimanded Zaluzhny for his comments. Suggesting that the situation is even more complicated, an article in Time painted a bleak picture of deliberations in Zelensky’s inner circle, while NBC carried a story about mounting Western pressure on Ukraine to consider a peace deal with Russia that would involve at least some territorial concessions.
Negotiations and concessions make sense in a situation in which, as I. William Zartman put it, the belligerent parties find themselves in a mutually hurting stalemate—that is, they are “locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them (although not necessarily in equal degree or for the same reasons).” While a burgeoning literature discusses ripeness theory in the context of internal conflicts, relatively little is known about its applicability to blended conflicts like the one in Ukraine, whose settlement prospects, according to Timothy D. Sisk, “may lie with the complexities of international coalitions more than [with] the within-country perceptions of protagonists, dynamics of power among them, threat, and sheer exhaustion after a protracted civil war.”
随着俄罗斯于2022年2月24日开始全面入侵乌克兰，第三方调解的背景发生了根本性变化。2014年9月的明斯克协议及其随后的2014年9日和2015年2月的两项执行议定书在此之前为调解提供了广泛的框架，特别是为欧洲安全与合作组织驻乌克兰特别监测团和三方联络小组的努力提供了广泛框架。
普京宣布俄罗斯所谓的“特别军事行动”意味着明斯克协议已经失效，从而在双方多年来执行不力的情况下划清了官方界限。从那时起，可以观察到三种部分重叠的调解努力。
首先，在冲突的早期阶段，莫斯科和基辅之间进行了直接的解决谈判。这些会议最初在白俄罗斯举行，后来在土耳其举行，还有一些在线会议。谈判接近达成一项基于乌克兰一系列让步的协议，这些让步将被放在一份联合公报中，供随后详细阐述。
这一进程的调解人之一，以色列前总理纳夫塔利·贝内特最近声称，莫斯科和基辅之间的协议之所以失败，是因为华盛顿和伦敦向泽连斯基施压，要求其继续战斗。德国前总理格哈德·施罗德在最近的一次采访中也提出了类似的观点（此处用英语总结），乌克兰议会中泽连斯基的“人民公仆”党领袖大卫·阿拉哈米亚也是如此。
但如果认为邪恶的大国利益迫使乌克兰放弃一项原本合理的和平计划，那就太简单了。首先，乌克兰在战场上的地位在2022年4月和5月显著提高。正如俄罗斯国防部副部长亚历山大·福明当时所声称的那样，俄罗斯于2022年3月底从基辅周围撤军可能是一种善意的姿态，也可能不是，但这消除了双方面临的两线战争的压力。西方武器输送的加强增强了乌克兰的决心，而俄罗斯成功地实现了其战争目标之一：建立通往克里米亚的陆桥。因此，到5月官方谈判破裂时，交战双方和乌克兰的西方伙伴都不太可能将局势视为相互伤害的僵局。此外，俄罗斯军队在布查和伊尔平犯下的战争罪行的曝光很快侵蚀了乌克兰（及其西方伙伴）与俄罗斯达成协议的任何公众支持。
With the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the context for third-party mediation fundamentally changed. The Minsk accord of September 2014 and its two subsequent implementation protocols of September 2014 and February 2015 had until that point provided the broad framework for mediation, especially for efforts by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (OSCE SMM) and the Trilateral Contact Group.
Putin’s announcement of Russia’s so-called “special military operation” meant the Minsk accords were dead, thus drawing an official line under years of lackluster implementation efforts by both sides. Since then, we can observe three partially overlapping types of mediation efforts.
First, there were direct settlement negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv in the early stages of the conflict. These were held initially in Belarus, then in Turkey, with additional meetings taking place online. The negotiations came close to an agreement based on a series of Ukrainian concessions that were to be placed in a joint communique for subsequent elaboration.
One of the mediators in this process, former Israeli prime minister Naftali Bennett, recently claimed that the agreement between Moscow and Kyiv foundered because Washington and London pressured Zelensky to continue fighting. Former German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder made a similar point in a recent interview (summarized in English here), as did David Arakhamia, the leader of Zelensky’s ”Servant of the People” party in the Ukrainian parliament.
But it would be too simplistic to assume that nefarious great-power interests forced Ukraine to abandon an otherwise sound peace plan. For one, Ukraine’s position on the battlefield significantly improved in April and May 2022. Russia’s withdrawal from around Kyiv in late March 2022 may or may not have been a gesture of good will, as Russia’s deputy defense minister Alexander Fomin claimed at the time, but it eliminated—for both sides—the pressures of a two-front war. The intensification of Western arms deliveries strengthened Ukrainian resolve, while Russia successfully achieved one of its war objectives: establishing a land bridge to Crimea. As a result, by the time official negotiations broke down in May, neither of the two belligerents, nor Ukraine’s Western partners, likely perceived the situation as a mutually hurting stalemate. In addition, revelations of war crimes committed by Russian forces in Bucha and Irpin quickly eroded any public support in Ukraine (and among its Western partners) for making deals with Russia.
其次，就具体问题进行了谈判，特别是人道主义问题，如释放被俄罗斯军队绑架的乌克兰儿童、交换战俘和黑海粮食倡议。这些始于2022年夏天，并一直持续至今，尽管取得了喜忧参半的成功。这些努力得到了卡塔尔、沙特阿拉伯和土耳其等中间大国的斡旋（部分是与联合国合作）。最重要的是，由此达成的协议是可能的，因为调解不影响交战方的核心利益。事实上，粮食倡议至少在一段时间内为双方的一些经济和外交目标服务。因此，第三方为使莫斯科和基辅达成协议所做的努力，通常是通过穿梭外交而非直接谈判，在很大程度上超出了相互伤害的僵局计算的范围。这些努力肯定了或多或少中立的经纪人的价值，但也指出了调解的局限性。
第三，这也是下面分析的主要焦点，自俄罗斯全面入侵乌克兰一周年左右以来，一直有人试图启动恢复直接停火和解决谈判。
Second, there were negotiations on specific issues, particularly humanitarian ones such as the release of Ukrainian children abducted by Russian forces, exchanges of prisoners of war, and the Black Sea Grain Initiative. These began in the summer of 2022 and have continued ever since, albeit with mixed success. These efforts were mediated by middle powers such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey (partly in cooperation with the UN). The resulting deals were possible, above all, because mediation did not impinge upon the core interests of the belligerents. Indeed, the grain initiative, at least, served some of both sides’ economic and diplomatic objectives, at least for a time. Third-party efforts to bring Moscow and Kyiv to an agreement, often by shuttle diplomacy rather than direct talks, thus took place largely outside the parameters of mutually hurting stalemate calculations. These efforts affirmed the value of more or less neutral brokers, but also pointed out the limits of mediation.
Third, and this is the main focus of our analysis below, there have been attempts to kick-start the renewal of direct ceasefire and settlement negotiations since around the first anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The “2+6” Stalemate “2+6”僵局
自2022年5月初步谈判破裂以来，解决俄乌战争的和平建议可概括为“2+6”。“2”代表俄罗斯和乌克兰总统提出的建议。乌克兰的提议在泽连斯基总统的10个基本步骤计划中得到了清晰简洁的阐述，该计划于2022年11月在巴厘岛举行的二十国集团峰会上首次宣布。
俄罗斯的提案远没有那么简洁，包含了一些口头和未言明的假设。其中包括普京在2022年3月与土耳其总统雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安的电话中发表的评论，以及莫斯科为巩固俄罗斯对克里米亚和顿巴斯的控制所做的努力，即乌克兰做出的意义深远的领土让步。在2023年12月14日的年终新闻发布会上，普京重申了他的“最初”战争目标——“乌克兰的去纳粹化、非军事化和中立地位”。此外，俄罗斯可能还希望与美国和北约就新的安全安排和保障达成2021年12月提出的两项条约草案的某些版本。
The peace proposals to resolve the Russian-Ukrainian war since the breakdown of initial negotiations in May 2022 can be summarized as “2+6.” The “2” represents the proposals made by the presidents of Russia and Ukraine. The Ukrainian proposal is clearly and concisely articulated in President Zelensky’s 10 Essential Steps plan, first announced at the G20 summit in Bali in November 2022.
The Russian proposal is far less concise and contains a number of spoken and unspoken assumptions. These include comments made by Putin to Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan in a March 2022 phone call and efforts by Moscow to entrench Russian control of Crimea and Donbas—that is, far-reaching territorial concessions by Ukraine. In his end-of-year press conference on December 14, 2023, Putin reiterated his “original” war aims—“denazification, demilitarization and a neutral status for Ukraine.” Additionally, Russia likely also wants some version of the two draft treaties proposed in December 2021—with the United States and with NATO on new security arrangements and guarantees—to be agreed.
自俄罗斯向西方发出这两份最后通牒两年以来，俄罗斯和乌克兰的立场截然相反，不仅涉及到各自在乌克兰领土完整和加入北约问题上的实质性红线，但也涉及到任何谈判的途径——在俄罗斯完全撤出所有非法吞并的乌克兰领土之前，基辅拒绝支持任何谈判。
在这些参数范围内，“6”代表不同第三方的和平倡议：CN、巴西、印度尼西亚、梵蒂冈、非洲国家集团和沙特阿拉伯，和非洲的提案都承认有必要尊重领土完整，将其作为国际法的一项基本准则，但建议将停火作为第一步——乌克兰断然拒绝了这一想法，因为这将冻结目前的前线，并使俄罗斯盘踞在非法占领的领土上。梵蒂冈倡议的重点是遣返被俄罗斯绑架的约20000名乌克兰儿童。巴西和沙特的努力集中在一个调解框架上，该框架可以促进基辅和莫斯科之间的谈判。这些提议都没有得到乌克兰或西方的明确支持。
“6”都是非西方的提议。与2022年2月24日之前的灰色地带冲突时期相比，这标志着一个重大变化，当时法国、德国和欧安组织在俄罗斯和乌克兰之间的调解努力中发挥了重要作用。西方坚持认为泽连斯基2022年11月的十点计划是谈判的唯一可信基础，这造成了自己的僵局，也造成了“6”的启动。
Two years since Russia issued these two ultimatums to the West, the Russian and Ukrainian positions are polar opposites, not only in relation to their respective substantive red lines on Ukraine’s territorial integrity and NATO membership, but also as regards the pathway to any negotiations—which Kyiv refuses to countenance before a complete Russian withdrawal from all illegally annexed Ukrainian territories.
Within these parameters, the “6” represents the peace initiatives by various third parties: Ch Brazil, Indonesia, the Vatican, a group of African states, and Saudi Arabia. The Chinese, Indonesian, and African proposals all acknowledge the need to respect territorial integrity as a fundamental norm of international law but have proposed a ceasefire as a first step—an idea roundly rejected by Ukraine, as it would freeze the current frontlines and leave Russia entrenched in the illegally occupied territories. The Vatican initiative focuses on the return of the approximately 20,000 Ukrainian children abducted by Russia. The Brazilian and Saudi efforts center on a framework for mediation that could facilitate negotiations between Kyiv and Moscow. None of these proposals has received unequivocal Ukrainian or Western support.
The “6” are all non-Western proposals. This marks a significant change compared to the period of the gray-zone conflict before February 24, 2022, when France, Germany, and the OSCE played major roles in the efforts to mediate between Russia and Ukraine. Western insistence that Zelensky’s ten-point plan of November 2022 is the only credible basis for negotiations has created its own stalemate—and the void into which the “6” were launched.
然而，谈判“战线”上的这种僵局并不是绝对的。乌克兰推动泽连斯基计划的努力取得了一些成功。沙特阿拉伯的倡议与乌克兰总统的外交努力非常吻合，他有机会于2023年5月在吉达向阿拉伯联盟所有22个成员国发表讲话。随后的阿拉伯联盟《吉达宣言》首次明确提到阿拉伯领导人“尊重……国家的主权、独立和领土完整”。吉达会议是（迄今为止）三次会议中的第二次致力于筹备一次乌克兰问题全球和平峰会的国家安全官员级别，该峰会将汇集国家元首和政府首脑。第一次会议于2023年6月底在哥本哈根举行，与会者包括七国集团、欧盟和美国官员，以及巴西、印度、沙特阿拉伯、南非和土耳其的代表。至关重要的是，吉达会议包括CH欧亚事务特别代表李辉，他是CN自己调解努力的负责人——迄今为止基本上没有结果。然而，李缺席了2023年10月底在马耳他举行的另一次峰会，这次峰会因以色列和哈马斯之间不断升级的战争而黯然失色。
“西方集体”——本质上是七国集团、北约和欧盟——迄今为止一直坚定地支持乌克兰和泽连斯基的和平计划。最近，七国集团在2023年11月8日的一份外交部长声明中重申了这一支持，该声明明确指出，“如果俄罗斯军队和军事装备不立即、完全、无条件地撤出国际公认的乌克兰领土，就无法实现公正持久的和平。”并重申七国集团成员国“继续支持乌克兰进一步发展总统弗拉基米尔·泽连斯基的和平方案”。
This stalemate on the negotiation “front,” however, is not absolute. Ukrainian efforts to promote Zelensky’s plan have met with some success. Saudi Arabia’s initiative dovetailed well with the Ukrainian president’s diplomatic push, and he was given the opportunity to address all 22 member states of the Arab League in Jeddah in May 2023. The subsequent Jeddah Declaration of the Arab League made, for the first time, explicit reference to Arab leaders’ “respect for … the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states.” The Jeddah meeting was the second in a series of three (so far) at the level of national security officials dedicated to preparing a global peace summit on Ukraine that would bring together heads of state and government. The first of these—in Copenhagen at the end of June 2023—involved G7, EU, and U.S. officials, as well as representatives from Brazil, India, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey. The Jeddah meeting, crucially, included Li Hui, China’s special representative on Eurasian affairs and point-man for Ch’s own—thus far largely inconclusive—mediation efforts. Li was, however, absent from another summit in Malta at the end of October 2023 that was overshadowed by the escalating war between Israel and Hamas.
The “collective West”—essentially the G7, NATO, and the EU—has so far been steadfast in support of Ukraine and of Zelensky’s peace plan. That support was reiterated most recently in a November 8, 2023, G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement that explicitly noted that a “just and lasting peace cannot be realized without the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of Russia’s troops and military equipment from the internationally recognized territory of Ukraine” and reaffirmed that the members of the G7 “continue to support Ukraine in further developing President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Peace Formula.”
七国集团还宣布，他们“将各自[…]密切协调，[…]根据七国集团领导人支持乌克兰的联合声明，就具体、双边、长期安全承诺和安排与乌克兰合作。” 除了含糊地承诺北约“在盟国同意并满足条件的情况下，将能够向乌克兰发出加入联盟的邀请”之外，该协议未能为乌克兰提供明确的加入前景。
综合来看，这两项声明可能为重新设定未来谈判的参数铺平道路，为乌克兰提供可信的安全保障，同时将棘手的北约成员国问题抛在脑后。西方可以继续口头上致力于泽连斯基的和平方案，就像西方盟友坚持1945年的波茨坦协议为德国制定了临时安排一样，同时实际上至少暂时减少了其全面立即恢复乌克兰主权和领土完整的雄心。这样的做法也将使乌克兰在加入欧盟方面继续取得进展，尽管进展缓慢。它不会明确与其他和平倡议相矛盾，尤其是CH的和平倡议，也不会排除西方继续提供政治、经济和军事支持，包括最终加入欧盟所需的改革和重建。
The G7 also declared that they “will each […], in close coordination, […] work with Ukraine on specific, bilateral, long-term security commitments and arrangements in line with the G7 Leaders’ Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine.” This declaration, which now has over 30 signatories, was issued the day after NATO’s Vilnius Summit Communiqué, which failed to provide a clear accession perspective for Ukraine beyond the vague promise that NATO “will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met.”
Taken together, these two declarations potentially pave the way for a reset of the parameters for future negotiations, providing Ukraine with credible security guarantees while kicking the thorny issue of NATO membership into the long grass. The West could continue to remain rhetorically committed to Zelensky’s peace formula, just as the Western allies insisted that the 1945 Potsdam agreement put in place temporary arrangements for Germany, while in effect scaling down, at least temporarily, its ambitions for the full and immediate restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Such an approach would also allow for Ukraine’s continued progress, however slow, toward EU membership. And it would not explicitly contradict other peace initiatives, notably Ch’s, or preclude the continuation of Western political, economic, and military support, including for the reforms and reconstruction necessary for eventual EU membership.
Reset: Path toward Escalation or Settlement? 重启：升级还是解决之路？
重新设定未来谈判的参数有许多潜在的优势。然而，任何这样的重置都是基于当地军事僵局的持续性——这不是一个相互伤害的僵局，而是交战双方可以接受的第二个最佳解决方案。它还基于这样一种假设，即任何一方都无法通过军事升级来取得胜利，也无法在谈判桌上改变现状以使其对自己有利。为了让维尔纽斯的重启发挥作用，双方（及其合作伙伴）都需要有理由相信他们有维持现状的政治意愿和物质资源，并能够可信地向另一方表明这一点——如果不是公开的，那么就关起门来，或者通过土耳其或沙特阿拉伯等值得信赖的中介机构。
尽管这是可取的，但这条前进的道路似乎不太可能。其他事态发展也使它变得毫无意义。在接下来的六个月里，我们很可能会看到与俄罗斯总统选举相关的升级和缓和的拉锯战。在此期间，任何一方都不可能公开承诺停火，也不可能放弃其明确提出的最大要求。
Resetting the parameters for future negotiations has many potential advantages. However, any such reset is predicated on the persistence of a military stalemate on the ground—not a mutually hurting one, but rather one that the two belligerents could accept as a second-best solution. It is also predicated on the assumption that neither side is in a position to escalate militarily to achieve victory or to change the status quo to their advantage at the negotiating table. For the Vilnius reset to work, both sides (and their partners) would need to have grounds for believing that they have the political will and material resources to sustain the status quo and to be able to credibly signal this to the other side—if not publicly, then behind closed doors or through trustworthy intermediaries, such as Turkey or Saudi Arabia.
While desirable, this route forward therefore seems unlikely. It is also rendered moot by other developments. Over the next six months, we are likely to witness a seesaw of escalation–de-escalation associated with the presidential elections in Russia. During this period, neither side is likely to commit publicly to a ceasefire, nor to give up on their articulated maximum demands.
泽连斯基的不投降立场在乌克兰得到了明显的多数支持。可以想象，随着俄罗斯给该国人口带来的任何额外困难，这种支持将在即将到来的冬季减少。但是，即使再加上西方支持可能减少，这些情况也不太可能使乌克兰回到俄罗斯全面入侵开始后的局面，当时乌克兰的生存似乎处于危险之中。
此外，乌克兰已经建立了复原力储备。尽管损失巨大，但其军事潜力尚未完全耗尽，其国内军事装备产量正在增加，动员计划正在加强。在最坏的情况下，由于匈牙利的反对，欧盟无法维持对乌克兰的支持，和/或美国在2024年11月总统选举前对乌克兰援助的僵局恶化，乌克兰能力的增加将足以阻止普京在战场上获胜。
然而，基辅继续战斗的决心和能力与莫斯科不相上下。克里姆林宫继续其所谓“特别军事行动”的动机部分是基于这样一种信念，即西方对乌克兰的财政和军事支持将因以巴冲突升级、七国集团主要国家的国内经济问题，以及西方国家首都和议会对乌克兰武装部队2023年在前线的缓慢进展感到沮丧。对这一前景至关重要的是特朗普获胜和/或2024年特朗普国会议员人数增加的前景。西方的制裁无法遏制俄罗斯的战争努力，莫斯科看到了一条通往胜利的道路，只需要通过吸收战场上更大的损失来与乌克兰的努力相匹配并持续下去。正如扎卢日内在《经济学人》上所说，在当前的消耗战中，时间有利于拥有更多经济和人口资源的交战方。
Zelensky’s no-surrender stance enjoys clear majority support in Ukraine. It is conceivable that this support will diminish in the coming winter months with any additional hardship inflicted on the country’s population by Russia. But even when coupled with a possible decrease in Western support, these conditions are unlikely to bring Ukraine back to the situation it faced just after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, when the country’s very existence seemed in peril.
Furthermore, Ukraine has built up reserves of resilience. Despite huge losses, its military potential has not been completely exhausted, its domestic production of military equipment is being increased, and its mobilization programs are being strengthened. In the worst-case scenario, where the EU is unable to sustain its support of Ukraine due to Hungarian objections and/or the U.S. stalemate over aid to Ukraine worsens in the run-up to the November 2024 presidential elections, this increased Ukrainian capacity would be sufficient to deny Putin victory on the battlefield.
Kyiv’s determination and ability to fight on, however, is matched by Moscow’s. The Kremlin’s motivation to continue its so-called “special military operation” is partly predicated on the belief that Western financial and military support for Ukraine will diminish due to the escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, domestic economic problems in major G7 countries, and frustration in Western capitals and parliaments with the slow progress of the Ukrainian armed forces at the front in 2023. Crucial to this outlook is the prospect of a Trump victory and/or the election of an increased number of Trumpian congressmen in 2024. Western sanctions having been unable to curtail Russia’s war effort, Moscow sees a path to victory that requires simply matching and outlasting Ukrainian efforts by absorbing larger losses on the battlefield. In the current war of attrition, as Zaluzhny put it in the Economist, time favors the belligerent with greater economic and demographic resources.
Conclusion 结论
经过近两年的战争和12个月在战场上取得的有限成果，莫斯科和基辅似乎都务实地接受了持续冲突的现状。这意味着双方的战争目标将从对胜利的公开承诺转向避免失败的立场。如果这一共同假设延伸到长期僵局，这将在两个阵营中巩固一种观点，即双方都无法升级而取得胜利。在这种情况下，基辅和莫斯科将寻求保护他们已经拥有的东西。对乌克兰来说，这意味着七国集团领导人《支持乌克兰联合声明》中所体现的那种可信的双边安全保障。对俄罗斯来说，这意味着乌克兰没有北约成员国资格，并将西方的支持保持在基辅技术优势以下，从而可以考虑在战场上击败莫斯科。
在现阶段，所有迹象都表明，交战双方及其支持者都在努力防止目前的僵局对任何一方造成过大伤害，从而使僵局可持续发展。如果他们不能做到这一点，双方将继续战斗，因为担心停止的后果。如果他们成功了，所有各方实际上都将屈服于稳定现状。这将为其他行动者处理人道主义问题创造空间，并可能使交战各方能够重返停火谈判。所有这些都不一定等同于乌克兰和乌克兰人应得的公正和持久的和平。尽管与第二次世界大战后的解决方案在许多方面存在严重缺陷，但它们也体现了最终在谈判桌上而不是在战场上实现这种和平的希望。
After almost two years of war and twelve months of limited gains on the battlefield, and with no major third-party peace initiative on the horizon that could change the belligerents’ calculations, both Moscow and Kyiv appear to have pragmatically accepted the status quo of continued conflict. This implies an adjustment of both sides’ war aims away from their public commitment to victory and toward a position of simply avoiding defeat. If that shared assumption extends to a prolonged stalemate, it will entrench a view in both camps that neither is capable of escalating to victory. In such circumstances, Kyiv and Moscow will look to protect what they already have. For Ukraine, this means the kind of credible bilateral security guarantees embodied in the G7 Leaders’ Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine. For Russia, it means no NATO membership for Ukraine and keeping Western support below the level that would give Kyiv such a technological edge that it could contemplate defeating Moscow on the battlefield.
At this stage, all signs point toward both the belligerents and their supporters working to make the current stalemate sustainable by preventing it from hurting either side too much. If they fail to achieve this, both sides will keep fighting for fear of the consequences of stopping. If they succeed, all the parties will in effect be resigned to stabilizing the status quo. This will create space for other actors to pursue humanitarian issues and possibly enable the belligerents to return to negotiations on a ceasefire. None of this is necessarily equivalent to the just and lasting peace that Ukraine and Ukrainians deserve. And while the parallels with the settlement after World War II are, in many ways, deeply flawed, they also embody the hope of ultimately achieving such a peace at the negotiating table, and not on the battlefield.
JANUARY 12, 2024
TETYANA MALYARENKO AND STEFAN WOLFF
https://www.ponarseurasia.org/unfulfillable-promise-mediation-efforts-in-the-russian-ukrainian-war-since-2014/
Tetyana Malyarenko is Professor of International Security and Jean Monnet Professor of European Security at the National University Odessa Law Academy and a Philip Schwartz Fellow at the University of Regensburg.
Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security and head of the Political Science and International Studies Department at the University of Birmingham.
乌克兰的军队表现和未来前景（2024年3月更新）
Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook
Updated March 14, 2024
自2022年2月俄罗斯全面入侵乌克兰以来，乌克兰武装部队成功抵御了俄罗斯的进攻，尽管存在一些明显的劣势，包括人员较少和国内国防工业规模较小。迄今为止，乌克兰武装部队在冲突过程中表现出了灵活性，并有能力将西方安全援助纳入其军事行动。尽管如此，乌克兰武装部队在维持对抗俄罗斯军队的势头方面仍然面临障碍，包括人员和设备损失。2023年3月，国家情报总监艾薇儿·海恩斯在参议院情报特别委员会作证时评估，
Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have successfully defended against Russian offensives, despite several apparent disadvantages, including fewer personnel and a smaller domestic defense industry. The UAF has demonstrated flexibility over the course of the conflict to date, as well as an ability to integrate Western security assistance into its military campaigns. Nevertheless, the UAF continues to face obstacles to sustaining momentum against Russian forces, including personnel and equipment losses. In March 2023 testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines assessed,
乌克兰从阿夫迪伊夫卡撤军，以及在过去几周里为避免进一步的领土损失而进行的斗争，暴露出随着外部军事援助的减少，乌克兰的军事能力受到了侵蚀。
自2022年初以来，拜登政府和美国国会一直支持乌克兰捍卫其领土完整，以抵御俄罗斯的入侵。随着议员们评估是否拨出额外资金支持乌克兰并监督美国的政策和援助，乌克兰武装部队不断发展的状况和表现可能会引起国会的兴趣。
Ukraine’s retreat from Avdiivka and their struggle to stave off further territorial losses in the past few weeks have exposed the erosion of Ukraine’s military capabilities with the declining availability of external military aid.
Since early 2022, the Biden Administration and Congress have supported Ukraine’s defense of its territorial integrity against Russia’s invasion. The UAF’s evolving condition and performance may be of interest to Congress as Members evaluate whether to appropriate additional funds to support Ukraine and conduct oversight of U.S. policies and assistance.
Personnel 人员
一些观察人士断言，乌克兰军队迄今为止的总体表现在一定程度上得益于高水平的招募和激励。然而，大量人员损失对乌克兰武装部队维持有效行动的能力构成了持续的挑战。
2014年俄罗斯首次入侵乌克兰后，乌克兰军队在乌克兰东部顿涅茨克和卢甘斯克（顿巴斯）地区与俄罗斯领导的部队作战，获得了重要的作战经验。2022年，乌克兰能够迅速动员这些退伍军人和其他志愿者加入新的志愿领土防御部队和预备役，而无需长期培训。
Some observers assert that the UAF’s overall performance to date has been bolstered, in part, by high levels of recruitment and motivation. High personnel losses, however, pose a continued challenge to the UAF’s ability to sustain effective operations.
After Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the UAF gained important combat experience fighting Russian-led forces in Ukraine’s eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk (known as the Donbas). In 2022, Ukraine was able to quickly mobilize these veterans and other volunteers into a new volunteer Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) and Reserve without the need for lengthy training.
据报道，自2022年战争开始以来，乌克兰武装部队伤亡惨重，部队素质下降。正规乌克兰武装部队和特种部队的损失可能更高，导致更多地依赖领土防御部队TDF和预备役部队。这些领土防御部队和预备役部队中的许多部队也遭受了重大伤亡，这进一步增加了重建部队所需的新兵比例。
乌克兰武装部队在部署新人员方面面临若干挑战。入侵时，乌克兰没有一支完全发展起来的专业士官部队，此前乌克兰一直在寻求按照北约标准发展该部队。由于受过训练的退伍军人人数众多，其中许多人有作战经验，因此不太需要士官部队来训练新兵。这些退伍军人的损失增加了发展一支专业士官队伍的重要性。
Since the beginning of the 2022 war, the UAF reportedly has suffered high levels of casualties, lowering force quality. Losses are likely higher among regular UAF and Special Forces units, leading to a greater reliance on TDF and Reserve units. Many of these TDF and Reserve units also have sustained heavy casualties, further increasing the proportion of new recruits needed to regenerate forces.
The UAF faces several challenges in deploying new personnel. At the time of the invasion, Ukraine did not have a fully developed professional noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps , which it previously had been seeking to develop along NATO standards. Due to the high number of trained veterans, many with combat experience, there was less of a need for an NCO corps to train new recruits. Losses among these veterans have increased the importance of developing a professional NCO corps.
乌克兰武装部队需要立即增援，这给部署只接受基本训练的部队带来了压力。然而，乌克兰武装部队还需要训练人员进行复杂的作战和操作先进武器，以维持作战行动。
目前，乌克兰武装部队也面临着越来越大的招募挑战。据报道，乌克兰士兵的平均年龄约为40岁。乌克兰官员表示，他们打算在不久的将来实施修改后的动员计划（如征兵制度的改变）。乌克兰军队官员还宣布了一项人事审查，声称执行支援任务的人员太多。
此外，乌克兰武装部队还努力为参谋职位培训军官，以协助指挥官管理和协调行动。在某些情况下，由于缺乏训练有素的参谋，导致更高级别的指挥人员协调和管理战术行动，导致决策集中化和缓慢化。
The UAF’s need for immediate reinforcements creates pressure to deploy troops with only basic training. However, the UAF also needs to train personnel to conduct complex operations and operate advanced weaponry in order to sustain combat operations.
Currently, the UAF is also experiencing growing recruiting challenges. The reported average age of Ukrainian soldiers is around 40 years old. Ukrainian officials have stated they intend to implement modified mobilization plans (such as changes in conscription) in the near future. UAF officials also have announced a personnel review, alleging that too many personnel are performing support missions.
Additionally, the UAF struggles to train officers for staff positions to assist commanders in managing and coordinating operations. The lack of trained staff officers has in some cases led to higher-level command staff coordinating and managing tactical operations, leading to centralized and slower decisionmaking.
Equipment 军事装备
乌克兰武装部队混合使用西方和苏联或俄罗斯的军事装备。据报道，这种多样的系统有助于提高各单位的不同能力，但使维护和标准化变得复杂。迄今为止，乌克兰武装部队遭受了重大装备损失，显然使一些乌克兰武装部队得不到机械化或机动车辆的支持。事实证明，乌克兰武装部队在面对此类损失时表现出了韧性，部分原因是西方的安全援助和乌克兰武装部队的协调维护工作。
The UAF operates a mix of Western and Soviet or Russian equipment. This variety of systems reportedly contributes to diverse capabilities across units but complicates maintenance and standardization. To date, the UAF has sustained significant equipment losses, apparently leaving some UAF units without mechanized or motorized vehicle support. The UAF has proven resilient in the face of such losses, in part due to Western security assistance and concerted UAF maintenance efforts.
乌克兰几乎耗尽了苏联和俄罗斯的火炮和火箭弹药供应，这使得乌克兰军队几乎完全依赖西方对这些系统和弹药的援助。迄今为止，乌克兰武装部队已经证明有能力利用西方安全援助（如远程精确火力）提供的质量优势来减轻俄罗斯在火炮方面的数量优势。然而，截至2024年初，乌克兰军队官员表示，西方火炮弹药的短缺阻碍了行动，并助长了俄罗斯的前进（例如占领了乌克兰的阿夫迪伊夫卡镇）。
Ukraine has nearly exhausted its supplies of Soviet and Russian artillery and rocket ammunition, making the UAF almost entirely reliant on Western assistance for such systems and ammunition. To date, the UAF has demonstrated an ability to use the qualitative advantages provided by Western security assistance (e.g., long-range precision fires) to mitigate Russian quantitative advantages in artillery. As of early 2024, however, UAF officials state that a shortage of Western artillery ammunition is hampering operations and contributing to Russian advances (such as capturing the Ukrainian town of Avdiivka).
乌克兰国内国防工业生产各种武器，但无法满足该国战时的全部需求。此外，俄罗斯军队继续以乌克兰国内国防工业为目标。
一些观察家断言，乌克兰的国际合作伙伴应寻求加强乌克兰的国防工业能力（包括通过与西方国防公司的联合生产协议），以帮助乌克兰满足其长期安全需求，减少对西方安全援助的依赖。
Ukraine’s domestic defense industry produces a wide variety of weapons but has been unable to meet the country’s full wartime demands. In addition, Russian forces continue to target Ukraine’s domestic defense industry.
Some observers assert that Ukraine’s international partners should seek to strengthen Ukraine’s defense industry capacity (including through joint production agreements with Western defense companies) to help Ukraine meet its long-term security needs and reduce its reliance on Western security assistance.
Role of U.S. and Western Security Assistance
美国和西方安全援助的作用
自俄罗斯2022年战争开始以来，美国已承诺向乌克兰提供超过442亿美元的安全援助。美国和欧洲的盟友和合作伙伴也继续为乌克兰提供训练、后勤和情报支持。与此同时，西方官员一再对冲突的潜在升级、国防工业生产能力的挑战以及采购和维持安全援助的资金可用性表示担忧。
Since the start of Russia’s 2022 war, the United States has committed more than $44.2 billion in security assistance to Ukraine. The United States and European allies and partners also continue to contribute training, logistics, and intelligence support to Ukraine. At the same time, Western officials have repeatedly voiced concerns over potential escalation of the conflict, defense industrial production capacity challenges, and the availability of funding to procure and sustain security assistance.
Training 训练
自俄罗斯2022年入侵乌克兰以来，美国和其他盟友一直向乌克兰武装部队提供培训和建议。目前的训练工作侧重于使用和操作西方安全援助、基本步兵技能和部队级发展以及联合武器行动。观察员们注意到，同时训练人员操作和维护武器系统是一项挑战。
尽管乌克兰武装部队仍然面临着在实地部署部队的压力，需要最少的训练，但它已经加大了优先考虑高级训练的力度，以支持长期发展。随着乌克兰武装部队寻求用军事动员的人员来弥补损失，培训的重要性可能会增加。
The United States and other allies have provided training and advice to the UAF since before Russia’s 2022 invasion. Current training efforts focus on employing and operating Western security assistance, basic infantry skills and unitlevel development, and combined arms operations. Observers have noted the challenge of simultaneously training personnel to operate and maintain weapons systems.
Although the UAF still faces pressure to deploy troops in the field with minimum training, it has increased efforts to prioritize advanced training to support long-term development. Training will likely grow in importance as the UAF seeks to replace its losses with mobilized personnel.
Equipment 装备
据报道，在战争初期，美国和欧洲提供的反坦克和短程便携式防空系统对乌克兰抵抗俄罗斯入侵至关重要。随着战争的持续，乌克兰的合作伙伴调整了安全援助，以应对不断变化的条件和乌克兰武装部队不断变化的需求。
In the initial phase of the war, U.S. and European provision of anti-tank and short-range man-portable air defense (MANPAD) systems reportedly was crucial for Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s invasion. As the war has continued, Ukraine’s partners have adjusted security assistance to respond to changing conditions and the UAF’s evolving needs.
在战术层面，乌克兰武装部队已将受保护的机动性（如装甲车和步兵战车）、坦克（包括豹式、挑战者式和艾布拉姆斯式）和战术层面的火力支援（如迫击炮）确定为其首要安全援助需求。乌克兰武装部队官员对他们对西方火炮弹药供应的依赖表示特别担忧，并声称缺乏供应迫使乌克兰武装部队定量炮击。
到目前为止，乌克兰的空军和防空系统已被证明在限制俄罗斯的空中优势方面是有效的。然而，俄罗斯在某些地区保持着空中优势，并继续以乌克兰的防空系统为目标。提供防空系统仍然是乌克兰武装部队在战略和战术层面的首要任务，以防御俄罗斯航空航天部队不断增加的行动。乌克兰官员强调了为乌克兰的防空系统确保足够弹药的重要性，因为预计俄罗斯将恢复对民用基础设施的袭击。
At the tactical level, the UAF has identified protected mobility (e.g., armored vehicles and infantry fighting vehicles), tanks (including Leopard, Challenger, and Abrams), and tactical-level fire support (e.g., mortars) among its top security assistance needs. UAF officials express particular concerns about their reliance on Western supplies of artillery ammunition and assert that a lack of supplies has forced UAF units to ration artillery fire.
Ukraine’s air force and air defenses have proven effective thus far in limiting Russian air superiority. Russia retains air superiority in certain regions, however, and continues to target Ukrainian air defenses. Provision of air defense systems remains a top priority for the UAF, at both the strategic and the tactical levels, to defend against increasing Russian Aerospace Force operations. Ukrainian officials have emphasized the importance of securing sufficient ammunition for Ukraine’s air defenses in anticipation of resumed Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure.
Current Military Performance and Outlook 当前军事表现与未来展望
乌克兰武装部队继续表现出高度的作战灵活性、机动性和能力。随着战斗转变为更具消耗性的战斗，以及俄罗斯利用其在人员和火炮方面的优势，一些观察家认为，乌克兰武装部队应该专注于维持其作战能力和建造防御工事。
The UAF continues to demonstrate high levels of operational flexibility, motivation, and capability. As fighting shifts into more attritional combat and Russia leverages its advantages in personnel and artillery, some observers argue the UAF should focus on sustaining its combat capability and constructing defensive fortifications.
乌克兰军队的指挥结构似乎比战争早期更加集中。虽然乌克兰军队寻求采用北约式（任务指挥）的指挥原则，但它仍然表现出苏联式（集中、自上而下）指挥的特点，尤其是在根据苏联学说接受教育的被军事动员军官中。此外，乌克兰总统弗拉基米尔·泽连斯基已经更换了乌克兰武装部队的大部分高级领导层，并任命亚历山大·西尔斯基将军为新的总司令。据报道，西尔斯基与泽连斯基总统关系密切，他的任命可能表明政治和军事决策更加一致。
The UAF command structure appears to be more centralized than it was earlier in the war. While the UAF seeks to adopt NATO-style (mission command) principles of command, it still exhibits traits of Soviet-style (centralized, top-down) command, particularly among mobilized officers educated according to Soviet doctrine. Additionally, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has replaced most of the senior UAF leadership and installed General Oleksandr Syrsky as the new Commander in Chief. Syrsky is reportedly close to President Zelensky, and his appointment may indicate a greater alignment of political and military decisionmaking.
俄罗斯武装部队在装备（特别是火炮和装甲车）、空中支援和电子战方面保留了一些优势。乌克兰武装部队用西方装备建立了新的部队（并重新装备了一些现有部队），提高了能力和生存能力。乌克兰官员表示，他们最迫切的需求包括防空、装甲机动、火炮和远程火力支援。特别是，需要装甲机动能力来装备新的和现有的部队。
乌克兰官员还注意到继续提供弹药的重要性，特别是在战斗仍以火炮为主的情况下。此外，乌克兰武装部队还确定了后勤、突破设备（如扫雷和桥接能力）、医疗支持、情报和安全通信方面的需求。
Russia’s armed forces retain some advantages in equipment (specifically artillery and armored vehicles), air support, and electronic warfare. The UAF has established new units (and reequipped some existing units) with Western equipment, providing improved capabilities and survivability. Ukrainian officials state that their most urgent needs include air defense, armored mobility, artillery, and long-range fire support. In particular, armored mobility is required to equip new and existing units.
Ukrainian officials also note the importance of continued ammunition supplies, especially as fighting remains dominated by artillery. In addition, the UAF has identified needs in logistics, breaching equipment (such as mine clearing and bridging capabilities), medical support, intelligence, and secure communications.
乌克兰武装部队仍然依靠专业部队的核心来进行联合武器行动和先锋行动。伤亡、疲惫和部队轮换的需要仍然是持续的挑战。乌克兰武装部队已经认识到需要招募更多人员（既要弥补损失，也要从前线轮换部队），但乌克兰尚未实施新的动员行动。培训新征募人员以取代和扩大专业单位以及工作人员职位的干事，可能仍然是一个关键目标。乌克兰武装部队再生部队和保持部队质量的能力可能对其成功至关重要。
The UAF still relies on a core of professional units to conduct combined arms operations and spearhead operations. Casualties, exhaustion, and the need to rotate units remain ongoing challenges. The UAF has recognized the need to recruit more personnel (both to replace losses and to rotate units from the from the frontline), but Ukraine has yet to implement a new mobilization call up. Training new recruits to replace and expand professional units, as well as officers for staff positions, likely will remain a key objective. The UAF’s ability to regenerate forces and maintain force quality likely will be critical to its success.
这些事态发展可能会影响美国国会是否以及如何支持乌克兰国防的决定。一些观察人士认为，如果没有西方的进一步安全援助，乌克兰军队将面临不断恶化的局势。其他观察人士认为，无论安全援助如何，乌克兰武装部队在彻底击败俄罗斯军队方面都面临着重大障碍。
These developments may factor into congressional decisions regarding whether and how to support Ukraine’s defense. Some observers suggest the UAF faces a deteriorating situation without further Western security assistance. Other observers argue that the UAF faces significant hurdles to decisively defeating Russian forces regardless of security assistance.
__________
作者：
Andrew S. Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European Affairs
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12150
2024年普通高考适应性测试英语
注意事项：
1. 答卷前，考生务必将自己的考生号、姓名、考点学校、考场号及座位号填写在答题卡上。
2. 回答选择题时，选出每小题答案后，用铅笔把答题卡上对应题目的答案标号涂黑。如需要改动，用橡皮擦干净后，再选涂其他答案标号。回答非选择题时，将答案写在答题卡上。写在本试卷上无效。
3. 考试结束后，将本试卷和答题卡一并交回。
第一部分 听力(共两节，满分30分)
做题时，先将答案标在试卷上。录音内容结束后，你将有两分钟的时间将试卷上的答案转涂到答题卡上。
第一节(共5小题;每小题1. 5分，满分 7. 5分)
听下面5 段对话。每段对话后有一个小题，从题中所给的 A、B、C三个选项中选出最佳选项。听完每段对话后，你都有10秒钟的时间来回答有关小题和阅读下一小题。每段对话仅读一遍。
例: How much is the shirt?
A. £19. 15. B. £9. 18. C. £9. 15.
答案是C。
1. What will Chris do next?
A. Drink some coffee. B. Watch the World Cup. C. Go to sleep.
2. What is the probable relationship between the speakers?
A. Strangers. B. Classmates. C. Relatives.
3. What is the woman’s attitude to the man’s suggestion?
A. Favorable. B. Tolerant. C. Negative.
4. What can we learn about Tom?
A. He’s smart for his age. B. He’s unwilling to study. C. He’s difficult to get along with.
5. What did Kevin do yesterday?
A. He went swimming. B. He cleaned up his house. C. He talked with his grandparents.
第二节(共15小题;每小题1. 5分，满分22. 5 分)
听下面5段对话或独白。每段对话或独白后有几个小题，从题中所给的 A、B、C三个选项中选出最佳选项。听每段对话或独白前，你将有时间阅读各个小题，每小题5秒钟;完后，各小题给出5 秒钟的作答时间。每段对话或独白读两遍。
听第6段材料，回答第6、7题。
6. Who is arranging the meeting?
A. Peter. B. David. C. Janet.
7. When does the man prefer to have the meeting?
A. This Wednesday. B. This Friday. C. Next Monday.
听第7段材料，回答第8、9题。
8. What are the speakers talking about?
A. Travel experiences. B. Vacation plans. C. Favorite seasons.
9. What does the man want to do?
A. Go to the beach. B. Find a summer job. C. Move to Washington.
听第8段材料, 回答第10至12题。
10. What does the news say about big online spenders in the US?
A. The number of them grows slowly.
B. There are more men than women.
C. They make up half of all shoppers.
11. How much did Americans spend shopping online last year?
A. $453 billion. B. $990 billion. C. $1, 500 billion.
12. What did George buy online last Sunday?
A. An adventure novel. B. A software package. C. A note by Mark Twain.
听第9段材料，回答第13至16题。
13. What has Richard been doing?
A. Visiting a museum. B. Watching TV. C. Studying.
14. Why does Susan call Richard?
A. To ask for help. B. To give thanks. C. To make an appointment.
15. What does Susan want to do?
A. See an exhibition. B. Buy a new cell phone. C. Take pictures of the snow.
16. What will the speakers probably do?
A. Go to a park. B. Play football. C. Attend a party.
听第10段材料，回答第17至20题。
17. Where did the speaker learn about college?
A. From the movies. B. From her family. C. From the books.
18. What helped change the speaker’s attitude towards study?
A. Her professor’s advice. B. Her graduate program. C. Her trip to Africa.
19. How does the speaker feel when she talks about her past experiences?
A. Regretful. B. Relieved. C. Grateful.
20. Who is the speaker probably talking to?
A. Conservation workers. B. High school students. C. College teachers.
第二部分 阅读(共两节，满分 50分)
第一节(共15小题;每小题2. 5分，满分 37. 5 分)
阅读下列短文，从每题所给的A、B、C、D 四个选项中选出最佳选项。
A
Yellowstone Poster Exhibition to Be on View at UW’s Coe Library
A first-of-its-kind exhibition that focuses on the history of Yellowstone National Park posters will be on display at the University of Wyoming’s Coe Library beginning Tuesday February 1.
“Wonderland Illustrated” will present posters and poster-style illustrations of the park spanning from the 1870s through 2022. The exhibition will be located on Level 3 of Coe Library. It will be on view through Tuesday, May 31.
The exhibition takes place at the same time as this year’s 150th anniversary of the creation of Yellowstone National Park. The posters in the exhibition serve the purpose of both advertising and art.
“We’re thrilled to be working with Yellowstone collectors Jack and Susan Davís, and Larry and Thea Lancaster to bring this exhibition to the University of Wyoming as part of year-long celebrations recognizing Yellowstone’s 150th anniversary,” says Tamsen Hert, head of UW Libraries’ Emmett D. Chisum Special Collections. “This exhibition involves the history of printing, art, photography and advertising over 16 decades. The images reproduced are found on travel brochures, postcards and maps—many of which are held in our collections.”
One poster from the exhibition—Henry Wellge’s “Yellowstone National Park” from1904—was recently purchased with donated funds and is now part of UW Libraries’ Emmett D. Chisum Special Collections. Wellge, a productive bird’s-eye-view artist, designed the piece for the Northern Pacific Railroad, which used it to advertise the park. This is a unique piece, as posters such as this one were printed on soft paper and very few have survived.
1. How long will the exhibition “Wonderland Illustrated” last?
A. Two weeks. B. Three months. C. Four months. D. One year.
2. What is a purpose of the exhibition?
A. To remember a famous artist. B. To raise fund for Coe Library.
C. To mark the anniversary of a national park. D. To tell the history of the University of Wyoming.
3. What do we know about the 1904 poster Henry Wellge designed?
A. It is rare in the world. B. It is in black and white.
C. It is printed on cloth. D. It is owned by a professor.
B
Parrots are prey animals, which means that other predators (捕食者) in the wild, such as hawks or snakes, are looking to make them into a meal. This one factor influences parrots’ behavior in your house more than any other.
Parrots are most easily hurt when feeding on the ground. Membership in a group plays an important function in ensuring their safety and improving their chances of survival from attacks by predators. The most common predators of parrots include hawks, snakes, cats, monkeys, and bats. Some predators make attacks only during the day while others hunt in the night.
As prey animals, parrots are constantly watching out for danger and they instinctively (本能地) react to risks. Their first choice is to take flight. However, if this is not possible, they will fight with their powerful beaks to defend themselves.
Because their biggest enemy is the hawk, parrots are especially reactive to quick movements from above and behind. For this reason, it is wise to avoid quick, sudden movements near your bird. This is a built-in reaction not subject to logic or reason. Simple and relatively harmless household objects can draw extreme fear responses from a bird. For example, a balloon may represent a hawk or a vacuum hose (吸尘器软管) may be the same as a snake in your bird’s mind.
As prey animals, parrots are often frightened by exposure to new household items or strangers. It is important to expose your bird to safe experiences and changes starting at a very young age to build flexibility and improve their adaptability. Variety in diet and toys, travel, and exposure to new people and places all help to make your bird more flexible and adaptable to change.
4. What is important for parrots to better survive from attacks in the wild?
A. Living in a group. B. Growing beautiful feathers.
C Feeding on the ground. D. Avoiding coming out at night.
5. What is parrots’ first response to an immediate risk?
A. To attack back. B. To get away.
C. To protect the young. D. To play dead.
6. Why would a balloon frighten a parrot?
A. It may explode suddenly. B. It may be in a strange shape.
C. It may have a strong color. D. It may move around quickly.
7. What is the author’s purpose of writing the text?
A. To explain wild parrots’ behavior. B. To give advice on raising a parrot.
C. To call for action to protect animals. D. To introduce a study on bird ecology.
C
In his 1936 work How to Win Friends and Influence People, Dale Carnegie wrote: “I have come to the conclusion that there is only one way to get the best of an argument — and that is to avoid it.” This distaste for arguments is common, but it depends on a mistaken view of arguments that causes problems for our personal and social lives — and in many ways misses the point of arguing in the first place.
Carnegie would be right if arguments were fights, which is how we often think of them. Like physical fights, verbal (言语的) fights can leave both sides bloodied. Even when you win, you end up no better off. You would be feeling almost as bad if arguments were even just competitions — like, say, tennis tournaments. Pairs of opponents hit the ball back and forth until one winner comes out from all who entered. Everybody else loses. This kind of thinking explains why so many people try to avoid arguments.
However, there are ways to win an argument every time. When you state your position, formulate (阐述) an argument for what you claim and honestly ask yourself whether your argument is any good. When you talk with someone who takes a stand, ask them to give you a reason for their view and spell out their argument fully. Assess its strength and weakness. Raise objections (异议) and listen carefully to their replies. This method will require effort, but practice will make you better at it.
These tools can help you win every argument — not in the unhelpful sense of beating your opponents but in the better sense of learning about what divides people, learning why they disagree with us and learning to talk and work together with them. If we readjust our view of arguments — from a verbal fight or tennis game to a reasoned exchange through which we all gain respect and understanding from each other — then we change the very nature of what it means to “win” an argument.
8. What is the author’s attitude toward Carnegie’s understanding of argument?
A. Critical. B. Supportive. C. Tolerant. D. Uncertain.
9. Why do many people try to avoid arguments?
A. They lack debating skills. B. They may feel bad even if they win.
C. They fear being ignored. D. They are not confident in themselves.
10. What does the underlined phrase “spell out” in paragraph 3 probably mean?
A. Defend. B. Explain. C. Conclude. D. Repeat.
11. What is the key to “winning” an argument according to the author?
A. Sense of logic. B. Solid supporting evidence.
C. Proper manners. D. Understanding from both sides.
D
For lots of kids, toddlerhood (幼儿期) is an important time for friendship. Studies show that the earlier kids learn to form positive relationships, the better they are at relating to others as teenagers and adults. Playing together also helps these kids practice social behaviors, such as kindness, sharing, and cooperation.
Even so, how quickly your child develops into a social creature may also depend on his temperament(性格). Some toddler s are very social, but others are shy. In addition, the way that toddlers demonstrate that they like other children is markedly different from what adults think of as expressions of friendship. Research at Ohio State University in Columbus found that a toddler’s way of saying “I like you” during play is likely to come in the form of copying a friend’s behavior.
This seemingly unusual way of demonstrating fondness can result in unpleasant behavior. Regardless of how much they like a playmate, they may still grab his toys, refuse to share, and get bossy. But experts say that this is a normal and necessary part of friendship for kids this age. Through play experiences, toddlers learn social rules. That’s why it’s so important to take an active role in your toddler’s social encounters by setting limits and offering frequent reminders of what they are. When you establish these guidelines, explain the reasons behind them.
Begin by helping your child learn sympathy (“Ben is crying. What’s making him so sad?”), then suggest how he could resolve the problem (“Maybe he would feel better if you let him play the ball.”). When your child shares or shows empathy(同理心) toward a friend, praise him (“Ben stopped crying! You made him feel better.”).
Another way to encourage healthy social interaction is by encouraging kids to use words- not fists-to express how they feel. It’s also important to be mindful of how your child’s personality affects playtime. Kids are easy to get angry when they’re sleepy or hungry, so schedule playtime when they’re refreshed.
12. What does it indicate when toddlers copy their playmates’ behavior?
A. They are interested in acting. B. They are shy with the strangers.
C. They are fond of their playmates. D. They are tired of playing games.
13. What does the author suggest parents do for their kids?
A. Design games for them. B. Find them suitable playmates.
C. Play together with them. D. Help them understand social rules.
14. What is the function of the quoted statements in paragraph 4?
A. Giving examples. B. Explaining concepts.
C. Providing evidence. D. Making comparisons.
15. Which of the following is the best title for the text?
A. How Children Adapt to Changes B. How to Be a Role Model for Children
C. How Your Baby Learns to Love D. How to Communicate with Your Kid
第二节(共5小题;每小题2.5分，满分12.5分)
阅读下面短文，从短文后的选项中选出可以填入空白处的最佳选项。选项中有两项为多余选项。
Common Mistakes New Runners Make
Running is a great way to get in shape and just about everyone can do it. However, many make a number of common mistakes, which can interfere (妨碍) with training or lead to injury. ___16___ , keep these things in mind to help you increase your chances of running success.
·Doing too much too soon
One of the biggest mistakes new runners make is doing too much too soon. Slowly easing into a training program will help reduce the risk of injury, so you can continue on with your new running routine ___17___ .
· ___18___
Beginners might think they need to run every day (or nearly every day) to meet their fitness or weight-loss goals, but this couldn’t be further from the truth. Running is a high-impact activity which can be really hard on your body. So it’s important to give your body a rest between workouts.
·Not wearing the right equipment
___19___, it’s important that you wear properly for your workouts. The most important piece of equipment for running is a good pair of running shoes, so be sure to do some research before you purchase a pair. Visit a running specialty store and ask an employee to fit you for a shoe.
•Running through pain
___20___ If something hurts when you run, you need to stop and treat the pain. Remember: It doesn’t make you less of a runner if you listen to your body to keep it healthy.
A. Not taking rest days
B. If you’re just starting out
C. Comparing yourself to others
D. Running can be uncomfortable at times
E. It’s important not to use the same muscles
F. While it may be true that you don’t need expensive equipment to take up running
G. Experts suggest increasing your running distance by no more than 10% each week
第三部分 语言运用(共两节，满分30分)
第一节 (共15小题;每小题1分，满分15分)
阅读下面短文，从每题所给的A、B、C、D四个选项中选出最佳选项。
I was halfway across Indiana headed home to Kentucky when my car broke down. My phone was ___21___, too. I managed to get to a gas station, but it was Sunday in the early fall, and there was no ___22___ on duty. I was working my way through university then and had little money for ___23___ the car.
I sat alongside my car for several hours trying to ___24___ the heat when an older gentleman ___25___ to fuel his car. He asked about my car, and I ___26___ my predicament (困境). To my ___27___, the gentleman told me that he had a daughter my age, and then he opened his trunk and ___28___ a tool set.
Right then and there, this total ___29___ examined my engine, explaining as he worked that my spark plugs (火花塞) hadn’t been charged for so long that they were ___30___ to function. After about an hour, he ___31___ that my car was safe to finish the trip.
___32___ came at the hands of a stranger. ___33___ his clothes, working on a hot September afternoon, this man ___34___ a college student from disaster, just because she could have been his ___35___ .
21.
A. busy B. loud C. dead D. secure
22.
A. mechanic B. policeman C. manager D. guide
23.
A. washing B. parking C. purchasing D. maintaining
24.
A. feel B. beat C. absorb D. produce
25.
A. promised B. refused C. stopped D. volunteered
26.
A. solved B. noticed C. escaped D. explained
27.
A. surprise B. regret C. amusement D. disappointment
28.
A. called up B. pulled out C. put down D. threw away
29
A. liar B. beginner C. stranger D. loser
30.
A. free B. ready C. uncertain D. unable
31.
A. pronounced B. agreed C. discovered D. doubted
32.
A. Tiredness B. Kindness C. Loneliness D. Carefulness
33.
A. Folding B. Drying C. Soiling D. Mending
34.
A. saved B. called C. judged D. banned
35.
A. friend B. daughter C. coworker D. customer
第二节(共10小题;每小题1.5分，满分15分)
阅读下面短文，在空白处填入1个适当 单词或括号内单词的正确形式。
Whenever you have to write a paper, a letter, or any other document for work or school, you probably head toward the computer. Now, most people reach for ___36___ (keyboard) faster than they pick up pens. In a Scottish primary school, however, Mr. Norman Lewis is taking a different approach. He feels that neat handwriting ___37___ (be) still an important skill, so he has his students write not only by hand but also ___38___ old fashioned fountain pens.
Fountain pens ___39___ (use) in schools long ago and have been regaining popularity lately because they are refillable. Today, a writer ___40___ (simple) throws an empty pen away and gets ___41___ new one.
So far, Mr. Lewis is pleased with the results of his experiment. He reports that his students are taking more care with their work, and their self-confidence has improved as well. He is happy with the ___42___ (improve) he sees in his students’ writing ___43___ in his own writing. He knows that computers are here ___44___ (stay) and that they will not disappear. However, he believes that the practice with fountain pens helps students to focus, to write faster, and they can feel proud of ____45____ (they).
第四部分 写作(共两节，满分40分)
第一节 (满分15分)
46. 你校英文报计划举办主题为“携手行动，节约粮食”的作文比赛。请你写一则活动通知，内容包括：
(1)介绍活动目的；
(2)说明参赛要求。
注意：
(1)写作词数应为80个左右；
(2)请按如下格式在答题卡的相应位置作答。
Welcome to Join the English Writing Competition
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第二节 (满分25分)
47. 阅读下面材料，根据其内容和所给段落开头语续写两段，使之构成一篇完整的短文。
Last summer, Hilda worked as a volunteer with dolphin trainers at a sea life park. Her job was to make sure the tanks were free of any items so that the trainers could train the dolphins to fetch specific items. However, one day after cleaning, one of the dolphins, Maya, presented Hilda with a candy wrapper from the tank. When Katherine, the trainer, saw this, she blamed Hilda for her carelessness. Upset but not discouraged by this event, Hilda decided to do some spying on Maya.
The next morning, Hilda arrived at the park early. She put on her scuba gear (水下呼吸器) and jumped into the tank for her usual, underwater sweep. Finding nothing in the tank, she climbed out of the water just in time to see Katherine jumping in on the other side. After what happened yesterday, Hilda knew what she was doing. She watched as Katherine performed her underwater search, but Hilda wasn’t surprised when she surfaced empty-handed.
During the tank sweeps, Maya had been swimming playfully, but now the dolphin stopped suddenly and swam to the back part of the tank where the filter (过滤) box was located. She stuck her nose down behind the box and then swam away. What was Maya doing back there? Hilda wondered. She jumped back into the water and swam over to take a look behind the box, and her question was answered. Hilda then swam across the tank following Maya’s path and emerged from the water to find Katherine removing her scuba gear. As Katherine turned around, her mouth dropped open. There was Maya at the edge of the tank with a comb (梳子) in her mouth waiting for her treat.
“Maya! Where did you get that?” demanded Katherine, taking the comb and throwing her a fish. “I know where she got it,” declared Hilda climbing out of the tank with a handful of items still wet from their watery, resting place. “What’s all this?” Katherine asked, obviously confused.
注意：
(1)续写词数应为150个左右;
(2)请按如下格式在答题卡的相应位置作答。
“This is Maya’s secret,” Hilda said with a big smile.
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Now Katherine realized what had been going on.
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